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13.1  Introduction 
The returns to labor market skills have risen in the past two decades, prompt- 
ing renewed interest in public and private sector training programs. Employer- 
provided training, which includes both formal training programs and informal 
on-the-job training, appears to be an important source of human capital acqui- 
sition. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth  (NLSY) data indicate that 38 
percent of  young adults in the United States participated in formal training 
programs such as company training programs, courses in vocational and tech- 
nical institutes, business school courses, seminars, or apprenticeship programs 
between 1986 and 1991 (Veum 1993). Despite the prevalence of these private 
sector formal training programs, few empirical studies have analyzed the em- 
ployer characteristics or types of companies that are associated with the provi- 
sion of employee training. 
The existing empirical literature on formal training has focused on the rela- 
tionship between worker characteristics, the likelihood of  participating in  a 
formal training program, and subsequent wage growth (see, e.g., Altonji and 
Spletzer 1991; Barron, Black, and Loewenstein 1993; Duncan and Hoffman 
1978; Krueger and Rouse  1994; Lillard and Tan  1992; Lynch  1992; Veum 
1994). In these empirical studies, establishment size and industry dummy vari- 
ables are the employer characteristics that are typically related to the incidence 
and effectiveness of training programs (see Bishop 1982a, 1982b, 1985; Bar- 
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ron, Black, and Loewenstein 1989). Research on private sector training has 
been limited by the availability of data sets that report firm characteristics,  such 
as profitability and capital investment, as well as information about training 
programs  and  worker  demographic  characteristics. For  example, Barters 
(1994) recent study of formal training programs uses an employer survey with 
extensive data on firm behavior and performance but no information about 
worker characteristics, such as education, experience, tenure, race, or sex. In 
contrast, many empirical studies of training have utilized the NLSY data set, 
which provides comprehensive information about worker characteristics,  wage 
growth, and the type and duration of  training programs but no information 
about employers’ investment behavior or profitability. 
It is widely accepted in the labor demand literature that skilled labor and 
capital are complements in production: more capital-intensive firms are ex- 
pected to hire more skilled labor (Hamermesh 1993). The implied empirical 
relationship between a firm’s capital or R&D investments and its provision of 
formal training is less clear. Firms that demand skilled workers may  either 
provide their own training programs or hire workers who have been trained 
by  previous employers or in school. The specificity of  skills determines the 
substitution possibilities between workers trained on the current job and pre- 
viously trained workers. In addition, we expect training to occur in firms where 
output and training tend to be complementary and the forgone output from 
training is lowest. 
In this paper, we use a unique cross-sectional  sample of white-collar workers 
from a Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) establishment survey to analyze the 
incidence of employer-provided training programs and their impact on wage- 
tenure profiles. In addition, we match a subset of  these data on individual 
worker wages, tenure, and participation in a formal training program, with 
firm-level data on profitability and investment behavior from the Compustat 
database. Using these matched data, we provide evidence on the empirical rela- 
tionship between firm profitability, firm investments in capital equipment and 
R&D, the provision of formal training programs, and the returns to training. 
A second goal of this paper is to evaluate  the feasibility of gathering worker- 
level wage, tenure, training, and demographic data in an establishment or em- 
ployer survey. This data issue is important because there appears to be consid- 
erable demand for employer-employee matched data sets (in this volume, see 
Abowd and Kramarz, chap. 10; Prendergast, chap. 9; Troske, chap. 11). We 
examine establishments’ responses to a pilot BLS survey, conducted in 1989 
and 1990, which tested the feasibility of collecting worker demographic data 
from establishments. We  analyze response rates to this pilot survey and com- 
pare our establishment-reported data to data for white-collar workers in two 
household surveys: the NLSY and the Current Population Survey (CPS). Al- 
though we find some significant differences in worker Characteristics  across all 
three surveys, we conclude that matched worker-employer data sets, based on 433  Training, Wages, and Investment 
BLS establishment surveys, can provide useful information about internal and 
external labor market behavior. 
A matched worker-employer data set has some advantages over household 
panel data sets, such as the NLSY, in analyzing employer-provided training 
programs.  First,  we  observe  multiple  workers  per  establishment  so  that 
employer-specific effects can be included in models of the incidence of train- 
ing and wage growth. Empirical models based on household data must ignore 
these employer-specific wage and training effects. Second, as noted above, our 
matched data set allows us to link individual worker wage, tenure, and training 
information with employer characteristics such as profitability, capitamabor 
ratio, and expenditures on R&D, for the subsample of workers employed by 
publicly traded firms. 
There are also some caveats to our data set and empirical approach. First, 
our sample size is small by  conventional labor economics standards, and we 
have retrospective data for starting wages rather than panel data. Second, the 
training variable we use is dichotomous-we  do not observe the type or dura- 
tion of the training that was provided. Third, our data set is not based on experi- 
mental data. The training programs we observe are endogenously determined, 
and we do not observe instrumental variables for the incidence of training pro- 
grams. Unobserved heterogeneity in productivity growth across workers and 
firms may bias our estimates of the effects of training on wage growth. 
13.2  Data 
13.2.1  White Collar Pay Survey 
The data set used in this study is derived from a subsample of the BLS White 
Collar Pay Survey (WCP), which is collected to determine the wages of private 
sector employees in  white-collar occupations that match occupations in  the 
federal government.' The WCP collects the straight-time salary and detailed 
occupation of  full-time workers (who work between 37.5 and 40 hours per 
week) from  a nationwide sample of  private  sector employers. The  survey 
samples goods-producing establishments in even-numbered years and service- 
producing establishments in odd-numbered years. The probability that an es- 
tablishment is sampled is approximately proportional to its employment. 
Our data set is based on a supplement to the WCP conducted in  1989 and 
1. The WCP occupations are accountants, chief accountants, auditors, public accountants, per- 
sonnel specialists, personnel supervisors/managers,  directors of personnel, attorneys, buyers, com- 
puter programmers, computer systems analysts, computer systems analysts supervisor/manager, 
chemists, engineers,  tax collectors, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, nursing assistants, 
medical machine operating technicians, civil engineering technicians, engineering technicians, 
drafters, computer operators, photographers, accounting clerks, file clerks, key entry operators, 
messengers, secretaries, typists, personnel clerks/assistants, purchasing clerks/assistants, and gen- 
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1990. In this test survey, 354 establishments  were asked questions about a ran- 
dom sample of their employees in “matched” white-collar occupations.2  The 
employer was asked to report the worker’s current and starting pay, age, race, 
sex, years of education, highest educational degree obtained, and tenure with 
the employer. In addition, the employer was asked whether the worker received 
“formal training (specific course work or a training program) within or outside 
the establishment which was paid for wholly or in part by the establishment.” 
Three hundred establishments provided information on current pay, tenure, 
and standard demographic characteristics for 1,727 workers between the ages 
of  18 and  Employers were least likely to respond to questions about work- 
ers’ starting pay and formal training.“ Moreover, when either training or start- 
ing wage is not reported for one worker in an  establishment, it tends to be 
missing for all workers in the establishment. Training is not reported for 28.6 
percent of the 1,727 workers, and over 90 percent of the workers with missing 
values for training are employed in establishments that did not report training 
for any worker. Starting pay information is not reported for 55.7 percent of the 
workers in the 1,727 sample, and over 86 percent of the workers with missing 
values for starting pay are employed in establishments  that did not report start- 
ing pay for any worker. There are 1,234 workers with valid responses to the 
training question in our sample, and starting wages are also reported for 601 
of these 1,234 workers. 
Our primary concern is that an employer’s decision to report training may 
be correlated with unobserved variables that also influence wages and the costs 
and benefits of training. We check for possible patterns in nonresponse behav- 
ior across establishments by  estimating a probit model where the dependent 
variable is one if the establishment did not report training for any worker and 
zero otherwise. Unfortunately, we do not observe any variables that are valid 
instruments for the incidence of training. Hence we do not attempt to correct 
for selection bias in our sample due to nonresponses but merely examine pat- 
terns of establishment nonresponses in the data. 
Table  13.1 reports the estimated coefficients for a probit model of  nonre- 
2. Establishments  were asked to report demographic data for a random sample of 2,386 workers. 
The mean wage and occupational  distribution of these 2,386 workers is not significantly different 
from the mean wage and occupational distribution of  the entire WCP sample from these 354 
establishments.  The sample sizes per establishment  range from 1 to 33 workers, with more workers 
sampled in the larger establishments.  Almost 80  percent of the sample was collected in 1990  when 
goods-producing  industries were surveyed. 
3. We excluded observations from the sample of  2,386 workers in 354 establishments for the 
following reasons: 362 for missing age, 25 because age was less than 18 or greater than 64,  17 for 
missing race, 17 for missing tenure, 208 for missing education, 16  because age minus tenure was 
less than 16 years, 1 because age minus education minus 6 was less than zero, and  13 because 
education was less than 12  years. This leaves a total of 1,727 workers in 300 establishments. 
4. We had the least success in obtaining information about the duration of  training programs 
from employers. Only 13  percent of our sample has valid information  about the length of training 
programs. The mean duration across these 231 workers is 5.18 weeks, with a median duration of 
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Table 13.1  Probit Models of lkaining and  Starting Wage Nonresponse 
by Establishments 
Dependent Variable 
Equals One if Training  Equals One if Starting 
Not Reported  Wage Not Reported 

















Below 1 million 
1-5  million 
Above 5 million 
Establishment size 
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(.2396) 
(.  1899) 
(3.0784) 
Notes: The omitted category is a nondurable-goods-manufacturing firm located in the Northeast 
outside of a metropolitan statistical area. Each observation is weighted by the number of  surveyed 
workers in the establishment. Numbers in parentheses are standard ermrs. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
sponse to the training question. We  find that nonreporting establishments have 
more employees and are more likely to be located in larger metropolitan areas 
in the Northeast or Midwest, on average, than the reporting establishments. 
Relatively low wage employers are slightly less likely to respond to the training 
question. The mean wage in nonresponding establishments is about 3 percent 
lower, all else equal, than the mean wage in establishments that report training. 
There is no significant relationship between the probability of reporting train- 
ing and the average education, experience, tenure, or the fraction of female or 
black workers in an establishment. 
As noted above, nonresponse problems are more substantial for a worker's 436  Stephen G. Bronars and Melissa Famulari 
starting wage. We  check for possible patterns in nonresponse to the starting 
wage question across establishments by estimating a probit model where the 
dependent variable is one if the establishment did not report starting pay for 
any worker and zero otherwise. Column (2) of table 13.1 reports the estimated 
coefficients for this probit model. We  find that reporting establishments are 
more likely to be located in the Northeast than the nonreporting establish- 
ments. No other establishment characteristic and no worker characteristics are 
significantly related to the probability of nonresponse. 
Throughout the paper we focus our analysis on two samples of the WCP: a 
sample of  1,234 workers with nonmissing training data and a sample of 601 
workers with nonmissing training and starting wage data. In our larger sample 
we impute starting wages, using starting experience and interactions  of starting 
experience as instrumental  variable^.^ In general, as demonstrated below, we 
find similar empirical results across samples. These findings, in addition to the 
absence of  a significant relationship (except for regional dummy variables) 
between worker and employer characteristics  and employer nonresponse to the 
starting wage question, suggest that restricting the sample to workers with non- 
missing starting wages does not result in serious sample selection bias. 
Table  13.2 reports means and standard deviations of  the variables in our 
two samples. The key variables in our analysis are the formal training dummy 
variable, the logarithm of  the current monthly wage (measured in 1989 dol- 
lars), the logarithm of the starting monthly wage (also measured in 1989 dol- 
lars), and job tenure.6  Approximately 30 percent of the workers in each sample 
received formal training from their employers. Mean tenure is substantially 
shorter and the current real wage is somewhat lower for workers with reported 
starting pay. 
13.2.2  Comparison with the Current Population Survey 
We first compare our data set to a sample of private sector white-collar work- 
ers in the outgoing rotation groups of the 1989 CPS employed in occupations 
that match those in the WCP. The CPS sample contains 15,784 private sector, 
nonagricultural workers between the ages of  18 and 64 who typically work 
between 37.5 and 40 hours per week. Table 13.3 presents sample statistics by 
5. The 601 sample is a subset of our 1,234 sample. We use imputed, rather than actual, starting 
wages for all 1,234 workers. Our starting wage regression includes starting experience and its 
square, education, an education and starting experience interaction, female, female interactions 
with  starting experience and its square, and dummy variables for race, two-digit SIC industry, 
region, metropolitan statistical area (MSA) size, and establishment  size. 
6. We converted all current reported wages into 1989 dollars, using the December 1989 to De- 
cember 1990 average change in the Employment Cost Index (ECI) for wages and salaries of work- 
ers in goods-producing  industries. We deflated nominal starting pay by the average hourly earnings 
of workers in the United States to obtain real starting wages because the ECI is not available for 
all starting years. All workers with less than 18 months of tenure were assigned one year of tenure, 
and workers with at least 18 months of tenure were assigned the nearest integer year of tenure. 437  Training, Wages, and Investment 
Table 13.2  Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
Variable 
~~  ~  ~ 
Actual Starting  Predicted Starting 
Wage Sample  Wage Sample 
Real monthly wage 
Log real wage 
Real starting monthly wage 
Log real start wage 
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Not an MSA 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations 
broad industry group (manufacturing; trade, finance, and services; and mining 
and construction) for the CPS and WCP data sets. We focus on within-industry 
comparisons because of  the rather large differences in industry composition 
across data sets (the preponderance of the WCP data were collected from es- 
tablishments in goods-producing industries). 
Workers in the WCP earn higher pay than full-time white-collar workers in 
the CPS, especially in  nonmanufacturing  industries. Some of  this large pay 
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Note:  Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 439  Training, Wages, and Investment 
more educated, and less likely to be female than workers in the CPS. In addi- 
tion, wages in the CPS are likely to be underreported; a recent study found that 
30 percent of CPS respondents report after-tax rather than gross pay  (see Po- 
livka and Rothgeb 1993).  We also find that worker demographic characteristics 
account for 57 percent of  the variation in log wages in the WCP; the same 
worker demographic characteristics account for less than 36 percent of  the 
variation in log wages in our CPS data. In  Bronars and Famulari (1997) we 
present a more complete comparison of the CPS and WCP data sets and pro- 
vide some evidence that the difference in unexplained variation in log wages 
across samples is due to greater measurement error in CPS reported wages. 
13.2.3  Comparison with the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
We also compare our data to a sample of full-time white-collar workers from 
the NLSY  in occupations that match the WCP. There are 779 white-collar 
workers in these occupations in the NLSY, for whom we  observe wages in 
1989, starting wages, and training. The oldest workers in the NLSY are aged 
32 in  1989. Table  13.4 compares means and standard deviations of variables 
in this NLSY data set to sample statistics for workers under age 33 in our 
WCP data set and the CPS. Because of the substantial differences in industry 
composition across data sets, we  again present comparisons of means within 
broad  industry  groups.’  First, note  that only  about  one-third of  our WCP 
sample and 40 percent of the CPS sample are as young as the NLSY respon- 
dents. In addition, less than one-fifth of the NLSY sample is employed in the 
manufacturing sector, where most of  the WCP data were collected. Despite 
these caveats, all three samples are reasonably similar with respect to educa- 
tion, experience, tenure, race, and sex in the manufacturing sector. In trade, 
finance, and services, WCP workers are more educated and less likely to be 
female than either NLSY or CPS workers. Average current wages are signifi- 
cantly higher in the NLSY in the manufacturing sector, and significantly  higher 
in the WCP in trade, finance, and services. Wage growth appears to be substan- 
tially higher in the NLSY than in the WCP subsample, primarily because start- 
ing wages are much lower and have a much higher standard deviation in the 
NLSY.* 
We  find that 23 percent of  white-collar NLSY workers and 28 percent of 
young WCP workers participated in training programs that were paid for by 
their employers. Note that we use information in the NLSY on participation in 
training programs that were explicitly paid for by the employer, which is only 
available from  1986 to  1989. We  therefore underestimate participation in 
7. We present comparisons only for manufacturing industries and finance, trade, and services 
because sample sizes for both the NLSY and the  WCP (age 32 and under) are  quite  small in 
mining and construction industries. 
8. We  also find that worker demographic characteristics account for 61 percent of the variation 
in young workers’ log wages in the WCP; the same worker demographic characteristics account 
for less than 35 percent of  the variation in log wages in our NLSY data set. Table 13.4  Comparison of Full-Time White-Collar Workers under Age 33 from the NLSY,  the WCP, and the CPS 
Manufacturing  NLSY  (N=  127)  WCP  (N = 283)  CPS  (N = 1,414) 
Current monthly wage 











Under 500  employees 
500-1,OOO  employees 
Over 1,OOO  employees 
Not an MSA 
Below 1 million 
1-5 million 




















































(904.39) Trade, Finance, 
and Services  NLSY  (N = 637)  WCP  (N = 88)  CPS  (N = 5,541) 
Current monthly wage 











Under 500 employes 
500-1,000 employees 
Over 1,OOO employees 
Not an MSA 
Below  1 million 
1-5  million 






















































Nore: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. 
"Predicted  starting wage for the WCP sample. 
bTraining  in the NLSY is employer-paid training since 1986 or beginning of job, whichever came last. 442  Stephen G. Bronars and Melissa Famulari 
employer-provided training programs for workers with tenure of  more than 
three years in the NLSY  ample.^ 
The NLSY also contains information about the type and duration of training 
programs that can be used to augment the training information in our data set. 
Among workers in the NLSY who received employer-provided training, the 
median duration of their training is 2 weeks, with a mean of 7.33 weeks and 
standard deviation of 27.4 weeks. For workers age 32 and under in the WCP 
data set with nonmissing training duration data, the median duration of training 
is 1.7 weeks, with a mean of 8.03 weeks and standard deviation of 24.7 weeks. 
Despite the fact that responses to the training duration question are missing for 
a large portion of our sample, we are reassured by the remarkable similarity in 
the distribution of training episodes across the NLSY and WCP data sets. 
Although we do not observe information about the type of training programs 
provided by employers in the WCP, this information is collected in the NLSY. 
Over 41 percent of the employer-provided training programs for white-collar 
workers (in matched WCP occupations) in the NLSY were classified as “for- 
mal company training programs run by the employer,” over 25 percent were 
“seminars or training programs outside of  work,” and over 21 percent were 
classified as “seminars or training programs at work, not run by the employer.” 
Given the other similarities in the two data sets, it is likely that workers in the 
WCP are also participating in the same types of training programs. 
We conclude that our sample of WCP workers in manufacturing are reason- 
ably representative of the population of white-collar  workers in manufacturing. 
This is especially true for younger workers. The smaller sample of WCP work- 
ers in nonmanufacturing is less representative of the population: WCP workers 
are more likely to be male, highly educated, and highly paid. In empirical 
results not reported here, we find that standard demographic variables explain 
a much higher fraction of variation in pay across workers in the WCP than in 
either the CPS or the NLSY. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that wages in the WCP are measured with considerably less error than wages 
in the CPS or NLSY. 
13.3  The Incidence of Training 
13.3.1  Empirical Framework 
We examine the relationship between participation in a formal training pro- 
gram and worker and employer characteristics by estimating the following re- 
gression: 
9. We  exclude the training information available in the NLSY prior to 1986 because it does not 
indicate whether the  employer paid for the  training program. Lynch (1992) shows that  formal 
training programs are more likely to occur after the worker has completed one year on the job, 
which suggests that our conservative approach to  measuring employer-provided training should 
underestimate actual training by  a small amount: less than one-fourth of the NLSY sample has 
more than four years of job tenure. 443  Training, Wages, and Investment 
(1)  Pr(Traino =  1)  =  Xl,eo + Z,Xo +  + Z,XJT  + El,, 
where i indexes workers and j indexes employers, Train,, = 1 if the worker was 
trained by her employer, X,, is a vector of worker demographic characteristics 
(including starting pay  at the current employer), T, is job tenure, and Z,  is a 
vector of employer characteristics. Equation (  1) includes interactions between 
job tenure and worker and employer characteristics to account for variation in 
the incidence of training due to differences in length of service with an em- 
ployer. The error term in equation (1) is assumed to have the following form: 
E,  = pl  + v0,  where y is an employer-specific component of  E,,  and  vy  is 
assumed to be identically independently distributed. 
If  workers share in the costs and benefits  of  formal training  programs, 
trained workers receive  lower  starting wages  and experience higher wage 
growth, ceteris paribus. Human capital models predict that  workers face a 
trade-off between starting wages and training opportunities and the more gen- 
eral the training program, the higher the share of costs borne by the worker. 
Thus we expect the coefficient on starting wages in equation (1) to be negative, 
and it should be the most negative for workers acquiring the most general 
skills. 
Starting pay may also be related to the incidence of training in equation (1) 
because starting pay may proxy for unobserved productivity differences across 
workers. Starting pay  is correlated with the amount of  skills acquired by  a 
worker prior to the current job and consequently with a worker’s productivity 
in human capital acquisition. Although it is plausible that workers with fewer 
skills at the start of  a job are more likely to receive training, all else equal, 
these workers may also be the least productive in acquiring human capital. If 
the marginal productivity of  human capital investment differs substantially 
across workers, relatively less productive workers may  have lower starting 
wages (due to fewer previous investments) and be less likely to receive training 
from their current employers. In contrast, relatively more productive workers 
may have both higher starting wages and be more likely to receive training on 
the current job. Therefore, within-firm heterogeneity across workers implies 
an ambiguous empirical relationship between a worker’s starting wage and the 
probability of training in equation (1). 
13.3.2  Empirical Results 
Comparisons to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
We  first present estimates of equation (1) that ignore the employer-specific 
component of the error term. We consider this “pooled” specification because 
training studies based on household surveys do not have multiple observations 
per employer and therefore must ignore the employer-specific error compo- 
nent. We  then compare our estimates to those obtained from the NLSY sub- 
sample in WCP-matched occupations. We use race, sex, education, tenure, and 
log starting pay  as worker demographic characteristics, Xv, and dummy vari- 444  Stephen G. Bronars and Melissa Famulari 
ables for broad SIC industry group and establishment  size as employer-specific 
characteristics, Z,. 
Column (1) of table 13.5 presents these pooled results for the 224 workers 
under age 33 in our WCP sample with reported starting pay. Few explanatory 
variables have  a significant impact on the probability of  receiving training. 
We find a significant positive coefficient on education and starting pay and a 
significant negative coefficient on the education and starting pay interaction. 
These results indicate that the workers most likely to receive training are rela- 
tively less educated workers with high starting wages and relatively more edu- 
cated workers with low starting wages. 
Column (2) presents regression results from the NLSY for the same specifi- 
cation of  equation (1). The patterns of training incidence across NLSY workers 
and young workers in the WCP are reasonably similar. In both data sets we 
find that the workers most likely to receive training are relatively less educated 
workers with high starting wages and relatively more educated workers with 
low starting wages. Formal training programs appear to complement schooling 
for workers with low labor market experience and low  starting wages, but 
employer-provided training programs may substitute for formal schooling for 
less educated workers with more labor market experience and higher starting 
wages. In the NLSY, we also find a significant relationship between tenure and 
the likelihood of receiving training, especially for workers with low starting 
wages, and significant differences in the incidence of training across establish- 
ment size categories and regions. 
Random Effects Estimates of the Incidence of  Training 
In this section we use the WCP samples described in table 13.2 to estimate 
equation (1) and test for the presence of employer-specific effects in the error 
term.'O In each case we strongly reject the null hypothesis that the variance of 
pj equals zero using a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test. It is not surpris- 
ing that we find an employer-specific component to the provision of training. 
In our sample of  1,234 workers with imputed starting pay,  148 establishments 
did not provide training to any of their 640 workers, 51 establishments pro- 
vided training to all 197 of  their workers, and 57 establishments with 397 
workers exhibit some within-employer variation in the provision of training. A 
similar pattern is found in the sample of 601  workers with actual starting 
wages: 65 establishments  did not provide training for any of their 297 employ- 
ees, 25 establishments provided training for all 88 of  their workers, and 34 
establishments exhibit some within-employer variation in the provision of 
training to their 216 workers. 
We test the hypothesis that pj is uncorrelated with the independent variables 
in our model using a Hausman specification test and fail to reject the null 
10. We  obtain similar results if we restrict the sample to the 224 workers under age 33 (compa- 
rable to the NLSY) in the WCP and use imputed starting wages. Table 13.5  Training Incidence: Full-Time White-collar Workers under Age 33 
Variable 
WCP  NLSY 





Log starting wage 




Tenure*Log starting wage 
Durable goods 
Trade and finance 
Services 
Mining and construction 
500-1,000  employees 
Over 1,000 employees 
Below  I  million 
1-5  million 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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hypothesis of  zero correlation in each WCP data set. The significant differ- 
ences in training propensities across employers documented above are insig- 
nificantly correlated with observed worker characteristics in these establish- 
ments. Therefore, we account for the employer-specific component of training 
incidence by  estimating equation (1) using employer random effects and pre- 
sent these results in table 13.6. Column (1)  presents estimates based on the 
sample of  601 workers with reported starting wages, and column (2) pre- 
sents estimates based on the sample of  1,234 workers with imputed starting 
wages. 
We find that a one-year increase in tenure, evaluated at sample means, sig- 
nificantly raises the likelihood of training by  0.46 to 0.80 percentage points. 
We find no evidence of significant differences in the incidence of training by 
race or sex, evaluated at mean tenure. In both samples, workers in MSAs with 
populations of  1 to 5 million and workers in the West are significantly more 
likely to receive training, evaluated at mean tenure. In the smaller sample with 
reported starting wages, workers in mining and construction industries are sig- 
nificantly less likely to receive training, and workers in the Midwest are sig- 
nificantly more likely to receive training, evaluated at mean tenure. 
We  include interactions between a worker’s starting wage and demographic 
characteristics to account for differences in the relationship between starting 
wages and the incidence of company training across workers. As in the previ- 
ous section, we find significant positive coefficients on both education and 
starting pay and a significant negative coefficient on their interaction term in 
equation (1) using either sample. Estimated coefficients on interactions be- 
tween a worker’s starting pay and other demographic characteristics were in- 
significantly different from zero in all model specifications.“ 
Table 13.7 presents differences in the probability of training across low start- 
ing wage (10th percentile), medium starting wage (median), and high starting 
wage (90th percentile) workers across four education groups: 12, 13 to 15, 16, 
and more than  16 years of  education. The coefficients in  table  13.7 are the 
differences between the estimated training probability for each type of worker 
and the estimated probability that a low-starting-wage high school graduate 
received company training, evaluated at sample means.’* We find that the inci- 
dence of training is highest for a low-starting-wage worker with a college de- 
gree. Training is least likely for a high-starting-wage worker with a graduate 
degree and a low-starting-wage worker with a high school diploma. 
11. Across the two samples in table 13.6, we find no evidence of significant coefficients on the 
interactions between starting pay  and either tenure, starting experience, or female. 
12. Table  13.7 compares workers across education groups at  the same relative position in  the 
starting wage distribution, and  not with the  same starting wage; e.g.,  a “high” starting wage is 
defined as the 90th percentile of the starting wage distribution for a particular education group. To 
put these relative comparisons in perspective, the 90th percentile of the log starting wage distribu- 
tion for workers with a high school diploma equals the median log starting wage for workers with 
a college degree (7.68). Table 13.6  Random Effects Estimates of lkaining Incidence among White- 
Collar Workers 
Variable 
Actual Starting Wage  Predicted Starting Wage 
Sample  Sample 





Log starting wage 




Tenure*Log starting wage 
Industry 
Durable goods 
Trade and finance 
Services 
Mining and construction 
Below 1 million 
1-5  million 




500-1,000  employees 
Over I ,OOO employees 
Tenure*Industry 
Durable goods 
Trade and finance 
Services 
Mining and construction 
Tenure*MSA size 
Below 1 million 
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-  .0099 
-.2257* 
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-  .2023** 
-.0718 
-.0105 
-  .0039 
-.0100 
-  ,0005 
-.0010 
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.ooo9 
-  .O52 










































Nores: The omitted category is a nondurable-goods-manufacturing firm located in the Northeast 
outside of a metropolitan statistical area with less than 500 employees. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 13.7  Tkaining Probabilities by Education and Starting Wage Group 
Education 
13 to 15 
Starting Wage  12 Years  Years  16 Years 
Actual Starring Wage Sample (N  = 601) 
Low (loth percentile)  .m  .0745**  .1020** 
Median (50th percentile)  .0232  .0692**  .0662 
High (90th percentile)  .0579  ,0599  ,0254 
Low (10th percentile)  .m  .0493**  ,0643 *  * 
Median (50th percentile)  ,0210  ,0536  .0545 
High (90th percentile)  ,0433  ,0583  ,0407 









Note: Reported numbers are differences between estimated probability of  training for a given 
worker and a low-starting-wage worker with a high school education. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
13.4  Training and Wage Growth 
13.4.1  Empirical Framework 
Ideally, we would estimate the impact of training on wage growth in a panel 
data set by  relating changes in workers’ log wages over time to their invest- 
ments in training. Our cross-sectional data set reports a worker’s starting pay 
and training at an employer retrospectively. We  therefore estimate a wage re- 
gression of the following form: 
+ &,Train,,  q + &,TrainL,  log(SW,)q + u,, , 
where log W,  is a worker’s current wage and the vector of worker characteris- 
tics, Xl,, includes a worker’s starting pay.  The coefficients on X,,  Z,, q,,  and 
Train, represent the impact of worker characteristics,  employer characteristics, 
job tenure, and training on a worker’s current pay, conditional on starting pay. 
Thus equation (2) models variation in wage growth across workers, and inter- 
actions between X,] and Z, and job tenure account for differences in rates of 
wage growth by worker and employer characteristics.  We hypothesize that the 
error term in equation (2) has an employer-specific component: u,, = q, + e,,, 
where q, is the employer-specific effect and e,  is an independently identically 
distributed error. 
Differences across the wage profiles of trained and untrained workers in our 
specification  are determined  by the parameters ao,  al,  and az.  The human capi- 
tal model predicts that the returns to training, that is, wage growth, should be 
highest for workers who bear the highest fraction of training costs. Workers 449  Training, Wages, and Investment 
who receive more general company training and relatively lower starting pay 
are expected to experience more rapid wage growth. In other words, the human 
capital model suggests that the coefficient a1  should be significantly positive 
and a2  should be significantly negative in equation (2).17 
13.4.2  Empirical Results 
Comparison to the National Longitudinal Survey of  Youth 
Using the same subsamples of the WCP and NLSY as in table  13.5, we 
estimate the relationship between current wages, starting wages, and tenure in 
equation (2).  We were unable to detect significant  differences in the slopes 
of wage-tenure profiles across trained and untrained workers in either sample 
(estimates of aI  and a2  were insignificantly different from zero). We attribute 
this result to the small variation in job tenure across workers and our relatively 
small sample sizes. We therefore focus our attention on empirical models that 
estimate a common training effect across all workers (i.e., that restrict a,  and 
a2  to be zero). 
Table 13.8 presents coefficient estimates for the wage growth model in equa- 
tion (2) for the WCP data set; results for the NLSY are presented in column 
(2). We find large significant returns to tenure in both samples, but substan- 
tially more regression toward the mean in wage growth in the NLSY. Females 
experience significantly slower wage growth in the NLSY, and more educated 
workers have significantly faster wage growth in the WCP. For most worker 
and employer characteristics, the pattern of regression coefficients are similar 
across samples. We find a significant positive relationship between training and 
wage growth in both  samples, but the effects are significantly  larger in the 
NLSY. The mean trained worker in the NLSY earns wages 8.8 percent higher 
than a similar untrained  worker, while the mean trained worker in the WCP 
earns wages that are 3.9 percent higher than a similar untrained worker, condi- 
tional on starting pay. 
Random Effects  Estimates of Wage Growth 
Using the WCP samples described in table 13.2, we test for the presence of 
employer-specific effects in equation (2) and reject the null hypothesis that the 
variance of q, equals zero. We then test the hypothesis that q, is uncorrelated 
with the independent variables  in our model using a Hausman specification 
test. In each WCP data set we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero correla- 
tion. In other words, we find evidence of significant differences across employ- 
ers in their average rates of  wage growth, but these differences appear to be 
uncorrelated with observable worker characteristics. Therefore, we report ran- 
13. Human capital models  make few sharp predictions about the shape of wage profiles for 
trained workers relative to untrained workers. The “predictions” we outline here are conditional 
on the linear quadratic log(wage)-tenure relationship specified in eq. (2). Table 13.8  OLS Wage Regressions: Full-Time White-Collar Workers under 
Age 33 
WCP  NLSY 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
Tenure 
Tenure squared 
Log starting wage 










Trade and finance 
Services 
Mining and construction 
Below 1 million 
1-5  million 




500-1 ,000 employees 
Over 1,000 employees 
Tenure*Industry 
Durable goods 
Trade and finance 
Services 
Mining and construction 
Tenure*MSA size 
Below 1 million 
1-5  million 






500-1,000  employees 








-  ,0009 
.9590** 
-.0921** 
-  ,0350 
.OW5 
-  .W85 
.O  125** 




-  .o004 
.1500** 
-  .m0 
.0075 
-.0311 
-  ,0503 
-.1272** 









































































-  .0999* 
-  .0406 




-  .0304* 
-.0132 
-.0167 




-  ,0043 
.0095 
-.0123 





































(.0150  j 
(.0102) 
(.27  12) 
Notes: The omitted category is a nondurable-goods-manufacturing  firm  located in the Northeast 
outside of a metropolitan statistical area with less than 500 employees. Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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dom effects estimates of equation (2) in table 13.9. Column (1) reports results 
for the 601 workers with reported starting wages, and column (2) reports re- 
sults for the entire sample of 1,234 workers using imputed starting wages.I4 
The results in table 13.9 indicate that an additional year of tenure, holding 
constant starting wages, is associated with 4.3 percent higher current wages in 
column (1) and 3.5 percent higher current wages in column (2), evaluated at 
sample means. This difference  in mean  returns to tenure  across samples is 
primarily due to the quadratic relationship between wages and tenure and the 
fact that the mean worker with nonmissing starting pay has about two years 
less tenure than the average worker with missing starting pay. The coefficient 
on the  tenure-starting  wage  interaction is significantly  negative,  suggesting 
that wages exhibit moderate regression toward the mean over time. 
Our estimates of a,  and a2  in table 13.9 are consistent with the predictions 
of the human capital model: low-starting-wage workers have the highest wage 
growth and therefore the highest returns to training. This result holds whether 
we use predicted  or actual starting wages. We also find that wage growth is 
statistically  significantly  higher for whites,  males,  more educated  workers, 
workers in trade and finance industries, and workers in the western region of 
the United States. Holding constant workers’  starting wages in column  (I ), 
current wages are 7.9 percent lower for women, 6.8 percent lower for blacks, 
and 2.7 percent higher for workers with an additional year of education, evalu- 
ated at sample means. The race, gender, and education wage differentials in 
column (2) are similar in magnitude. 
Table 13.10  presents estimates of average training effects for workers at the 
loth, 50th, and the 90th percentiles of the starting wage distribution, evaluated 
at mean tenure. Female workers who received company training and earned 
low starting wages earn 5.5 to 10.2 percent higher wages than similar untrained 
workers in our samples. Trained female workers with the median starting wage 
receive 3.3 to 7.1 percent significantly higher current wages than similar un- 
trained female workers. The current pay of trained female workers with high 
starting wages is insignificantly  higher than the current wages of similar un- 
trained female workers. The evidence of training effects for males is somewhat 
weaker; trained male workers with low starting wages currently earn 3.5 to 6.3 
percent significantly higher wages than similar untrained male workers. The 
training effects for male workers with median and high starting wages are in- 
significantly different from zero in both samples.  ‘s 
The evidence in table 13.10 suggests that employer-provided training has a 
14. The specification differs from that in the previous section because it includes tenure squared, 
which is insignificant in eq. (l), and excludes the starting wage-education interaction, which is 
insignificant in eq. (2). Including tenure squared in eq.  (1) or the starting wage-education interac- 
tion in eq. (2)  does not substantially affect either set of results. 
15. Note that we find larger and more significant effects for women than for men for the simple 
reason that women’s average starting wage is lower than men’s (there is no female-tenure-starting 
wage interaction in the  regression). Thus, e.g., we would find a similar pattern for less educated 




Log (starting wage) 









Train*Tenure*Log starting wage 
Industry 
Durable goods 
Trade and finance 
Services 
Mining and construction 
Below 1 million 
1-5  million 




500-1,000  employees 
Over 1  ,OOO  employees 
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Tenure*MSA size 
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-  ,0039 
.0174 
.0023 
-  .0053 
-.0554* 
-  ,0334 
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-.0059 
-  ,0086 
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.0162** 
-.0111* 
-  .0074 
,0174 
,0023 
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,0012 
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are standard errors. 
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Table 13.10  Predicted Wage Growth of Trained Workers by Starting 
Wage Group 
Actual Starting  Predicted Starting 
Wage Sample  Wage Sample 
Starting Wage  Female  Male  Female  Male 
Low ( 10th percentile)  .1018**  .0629**  .0545**  .0354* 
Median (50th percentile)  .0710**  .0094  ,033  1 *  ,0018 
High (90th percentile)  ,0327  -  ,0464  ,0064  -  ,0322 
(.0270)  (.0221)  i.0250)  ( ,0209  ) 
(.0224)  i.0235)  (.0195)  (.0581) 
(.0220)  i.0345)  (.0201)  (.0325) 
Nutet Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
significant  effect  on  wage  growth  for workers  with  relatively  low  starting 
wages. This effect is much less significant among workers with median to high 
starting wages. These results are consistent with human  capital models that 
predict that workers receive returns to investments in training (experience more 
rapid wage growth) if they pay for the training through a lower starting wage. 
Workers who earned a relatively high starting wage and received training did 
not experience more rapid wage growth than untrained workers with relatively 
high starting wages in our sample. These differences may be due to differences 
in the specificity. duration, or intensity of training across workers with high 
and low starting wages. 
13.5  Matching WCP Data with Firm Characteristics 
from Compustat and CRSP 
One of  the main contributions of this paper is to examine the relationship 
between company training and firm characteristics in greater detail than previ- 
ous studies.  In  order to accomplish this, we matched establishments  in our 
larger WCP sample to their publicly traded parent corporations in the Compu- 
stat database, which includes all firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMSE), and NASDAQ exchange. (The 
Compustat data are compiled by Standard and Poor’s from a firm’s annual re- 
ports, financial statements, and 10K reports.) Many establishments in the WCP 
survey are not owned by these large publicly traded corporations, but there are 
84 establishments owned by 69 different corporations that report valid current 
wage, demographic, and training data for 471 of their workers. We  use this 
subsample of the WCP in our analysis of training and firm-specific characteris- 
tics. The Compustat database reports a firm’s market value of equity, the value 
of its physical capital stock (plant and equipment) net of  depreciation, R&D 454  Stephen G. Bronars and  Melissa Famulari 
expenditures, annual sales, and employment, in addition to a number of other 
financial variables. We  were also able to match 61 firms and 420 workers to 
Center for Research  in  Security Prices (CRSP) data.  CRSP data provide 
monthly (NYSE) or daily (AMSE and NASDAQ) stock market data for each 
of these firms. We determine each firm’s annual stock market return in the year 
prior to the WCP survey. 
The four firm characteristics that we use in our analysis are firm size (the 
logarithm of  a firm’s market value of  equity), capital intensity (the logarithm 
of a firm’s capitavlabor ratio), R&D intensity (R&D/sales ratio),16 and firm 
profitability (the firm’s return on equity in the year prior to the WCP survey). 
Table 13.11 reports firm averages of the key variables in our analysis, and the 
number of  corporations for which each variable is reported. Note that some 
variables, especially R&D, are not reported by some publicly traded corpora- 
tions. Given our small sample sizes, we do not exclude these firms from our 
analysis. Instead, we replace all missing values with zeros and include a set of 
four “missing” dummy variables in our wage and training models. Each miss- 
ing dummy variable equals one if the corresponding firm characteristic is not 
reported, and zero otherwise. As a result, we use all 69 firms and 471 workers 
throughout our analysis. 
Table 13.11 presents means and standard deviations of worker characteris- 
tics for this subsample. Given our relatively small sample size we only report 
results for our sample of workers with imputed starting wages.17 Note that the 
workers in the Compustat sample have 9.5 percent higher current wages, have 
1.4 more years of tenure, and are less likely to be female than in our previous 
sample of workers with imputed starting wages. Employees in these large pub- 
licly traded firms are more likely to be employed in establishments in the 
South, more likely to have more than 1,000 employees, less likely to be in an 
MSA, and less likely to be in a service industry. 
13.5.1 
In estimating the probability of  training in equation (l),  we use the same 
explanatory variables as in table 13.6, with two exceptions. First, we measure 
employer size as the logarithm of a firm’s market value of equity and exclude 
establishment size dummy variables from the regression. We  also include the 
logarithm of a firm’s capitalflabor  ratio, the ratio of a firm’s R&D expenditures 
to its annual sales, and the firm’s annual real stock market return (adjusted for 
dividends) in the previous year as employer characteristics, Z,. 
We  find no evidence that worker characteristics are significantly related to 
the incidence of training across workers: we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
The Incidence of Training and Firm Characteristics 
16.  All the Cornpustat variables we use in the analysis are real dollar averages compiled over the 
five-year period preceding the WCP survey. We do not use the logarithm  of R&D as an explanatory 
variable, because R&D is zero for a number of  firms, and instead consider the ratio of R&D to 
annual sales. 
17. Of the 471 workers in Compustat firms, we have reported starting wages for 220 workers. 455  Training, Wages, and Investment 
Table 13.11  Sample Statistics for Publicly Traded Firms  and Their Employees 
Variable  Observations  Mean (Standard Deviation) 
I. Means by 69 Firms 
Capital stock (billion $)  69 
CapitaYlabor (thousand $ per worker)  66 
Log (capital/labor)  66 
Market value  67 
Log (market value)  67 
Sales  69 
R&D  45 
R&D/sales  45 
Real annual return, previous year  61 
Real monthly wage  47 1 
Log (real wage)  47 1 
Predicted log start wage  47 1 
Tenure  47 1 
Train  47 1 
Education  47 1 
Starting potential experience  47 1 
Female  47 1 
Black  47 I 
Nondurable goods  47 1 
Durable goods  47 I 
Trade and finance  47 1 
Services  47 1 
Mining and construction  47 1 
Not an MSA  47 1 
Below  I  million  47 1 
1-5  million  47 1 
Above 5 million  47 1 
Northeast  47 1 
Midwest  47 1 
South  47 1 
West  47 1 
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(I  393) 
(7.380.0) 
(9,962.0) 

























that the coefficients on Xi,, XJ,,  and qT,  are all equal to zero.18 It is surprising 
that we do not find a significant effect of years of tenure on the probability of 
training. Employer characteristics are significantly related to the incidence of 
training,  but  these  regressors  vary  only across employers and not  workers. 
Therefore, we present estimates of equation (1) that rely only on firm average 
data, where our dependent variable is the fraction of  workers trained  in the 
company. 
18. We find similar coefficient estimates on worker characteristics in this smaller Compustat 
sample when using the same Z, vector as in table 13.3. The  finding that coefficients on starting 
wage, education, the starting wagexducation interaction, and tenure are insignificant is attribut- 
able to the smaller sample size and the inclusion of a firm’s market value of equity, log capital/ 
labor ratio, R&D/sales ratio, and stock return in the 2, vector. 456  Stephen G. Bronars and Melissa Famulari 
Table 13.12  lkaining Incidence: Linear ProbabTty Model Results across 
69 Firms 
Variable 
Coefficient  Coefficient 
(1)  (2) 






Trade and finance 
Services 
Mining and construction 
MSA size 
Below 1 million 
1-5  million 












(.  1501) 
-.4341 









(. 15 14) 
,0362 









-  .2264 
(.  17  13) 
-  .0674 
(.1157) 




















Notes:  The omitted category is a nondurable-goods-manufacturing firm located in the Northeast 
outside of a metropolitan statistical area. We also include dummy variables in the model for miss- 
ing R&D, capitalflabor ratio, market value, and stock market return data.  Numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Column  (1)  of  table  13.12 presents  the  results of  a  regression model 
weighted by  the number of  workers per firm including only industry, MSA 
size, and region dummy variables as explanatory variables. Column (2) in- 
cludes these variables as well as the firm size, capital intensity, R&D intensity, 
and stock return variables calculated from Compustat and CRSP. We find that 457  ‘Training,  Wages, and Investment 
larger firms train a greater fraction of their workers. A  10 percent increase in 
the market value of equity, evaluated at sample means, increases the fraction 
of  workers trained in a firm by 0.844 percentage points. Conditional on firm 
size, firms with higher R&D/sales ratios train a significantly smaller fraction 
of their workers. A 10 percent increase in the ratio of R&D to sales, evaluated 
at sample means (i.e., an increase of 0.00239) is associated with a 1.78  percent- 
age point decline in the fraction of workers trained by a firm. Finally, we find 
that a firm’s capitalllabor ratio is unrelated to its likelihood of  providing em- 
ployee training. 
Our empirical results that capital intensity and R&D intensity are not posi- 
tively related to the incidence of formal training contrasts with the well-known 
empirical result that capital and skilled labor tend to be complements in pro- 
duction.  Our results  suggest  that  even  though  capital-intensive  and  R&D- 
intensive firms may employ more highly skilled labor, their workers are more 
likely to have obtained these skills in school, through previous employers, or 
through informal on-the-job training. Our results suggest that the costs of of- 
fering formal training programs are relatively lower in large corporations but 
appear relatively higher in companies that make large investments in R&D. 
13.5.2  Wages, Training, and Firm Characteristics 
We now consider the relationship between wage growth, training, and firm 
characteristics. We estimate equation (2) using ordinary least squares and can- 
not reject the null hypothesis of zero within-employer  correlation in the error 
term u,,. We therefore present OLS estimates of equation (2) in table 13.13. In 
table 13.9 above, we found strong evidence of an employer-specific component 
of the error term in equation (2). Much of the across-employer variation  in 
wage growth appears to be accounted for by the inclusion of the capital inten- 
sity, stock market return, R&D intensity, and market value variables in the re- 
gression. 
There have been few empirical studies of individual worker pay  and firm 
profitability, capital intensity, and R&D intensity, other than studies of  CEO 
and top executive pay (Troske 1993) is one of  the few empirical studies that 
analyzes the relationship between individual worker pay and a plant’s capital 
stock). Therefore, in column  (1) of table  13.13 we present a standard wage 
regression  that  includes these firm characteristics but excludes training  and 
starting wage variables. We find that capital intensity is much more important 
than firm size in  explaining wage variation across  employer^.'^ A  10 percent 
increase in the capitalllabor ratio is associated with 1.07 percent higher wages. 
Wages are  also significantly  higher  in firms  that  spend  relatively  more  on 
R&D; a 10 percent increase in the ratio of R&D to sales is associated with a 
19. Troske (1993;  chap. 11  in this volume) finds a similar result for wages and an establishment’s 
capital stock. Conditional on capital intensity wages are  insignificantly related to firm size mea- 
sured by market value, employment, or sales. 458  Stephen G. Bronars and Melissa Famulari 
Table 13.13  OLS Log Wage Regression: Workers in Publicly Traded Firms 
Variable 
Adding Compustat  Wage Regression with 
CRSP, Compustat, and  and CRSP to Standard 
OLS Wage Regression  Starting Pay 











Log market value 
Stock return 
Predicted starting wage 
Tenure*Log predicted starting wage 
Train 
Train*Tenure 
















































-  .0208 
-.2940 
.127 1 ** 
-  .0168** 
.0722* 
6.2008** 


























Notes: We  also include dummy variables for SIC industry, region, and whether in an MSA, and 
these dummy variables interacted with tenure. We  include dummy variables for missing R&D, 
capitalflabor  ratio, market value, and stock return data, and interactions between these four vari- 
ables and Train. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*Significant  at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
0.40 percent increase in wages. These empirical results suggest that capital- 
intensive and R&D-intensive firms employ workers with greater unobserved 
labor market skills, ceteris paribus. Thus our regression results support the 
hypothesis that skilled labor and capital, and skilled labor and R&D, are com- 
plements in production. Finally, note that a 10  percent increase in a firm’s stock 
market return is associated with 1.14 percent higher wages. 
In column (2) of table 13.13 we present estimates of the wage growth model 
in equation (2). We  allow the returns to training to vary across companies by 
interacting training with capital intensity, stock market return, R&D intensity, 
and log market value. The average trained worker in our sample  has 5.7 percent 
higher wages than the average untrained worker, though this difference is not 459  Training, Wages, and Investment 
statistically significant. As in table 13.7, we find a significant training effect 
for workers with relatively low starting wages. 
The results in table 13.13 indicate that wage growth for trained workers is 
significantly higher in more capital-intensive and R&D-intensive firms. A  10 
percent increase in the ratio of R&D to sales significantly increases the return 
to training by  1.48 percentage points. A 10 percent increase in the capitalllabor 
ratio raises the return to training by  0.72 percentage points. Given the large 
variation in  log capitalllabor and R&D/sales in our sample, it appears that 
much of  the variation in returns to training across workers is attributable to 
differences in firms’ investments in capital equipment and R&D.*O 
The combined results of  tables 13.12 and 13.13 indicate that (i) large em- 
ployers are significantly more likely to provide training to their workers, (ii) 
conditional on firm size, a firm’s capitflabor ratio is unrelated to its propensity 
to provide formal training to its workers, (iii) conditional on firm size, R&D- 
intensive firms are significantly less likely to provide formal training to their 
workers, (iv) both R&D- and capital-intensive firms employ relatively more 
skilled  workers, and  (v) when  training  is provided  by  capital- and R&D- 
intensive firms, their trained workers exhibit significantly faster wage growth 
than similar untrained workers. These results suggest that skilled labor is com- 
plementary to capital and R&D but R&D-  and capital-intensive firms face 
higher costs of providing these skills through formal training programs. 
13.6  Conclusions 
In this paper we use a unique microdata set of white-collar workers that (i) 
has multiple observations per employer and (ii) allows us to match workers to 
their publicly traded employers in the CRSP and Compustat databases. Our 
data set is representative of the population of white-collar workers in manufac- 
turing, based on CPS and NLSY samples, but overrepresents highly educated, 
high-wage, male workers outside of manufacturing. Patterns in the incidence 
and duration of training programs between young workers in our sample and 
white-collar workers in the NLSY are remarkably similar. There appears to be 
substantially less measurement error in wages in our sample than in either the 
NLSY or the CPS. The human capital and demographic variables used in stan- 
dard wage regressions account for a much higher fraction of the variation in 
establishment-reported wages  than  household-reported wages  for  similar 
workers. Thus our empirical results suggest that matched worker-employer 
data sets based on BLS establishment surveys, such as the one analyzed here, 
can provide useful information about labor market behavior. 
Company-provided formal training has a substantial employer-specific com- 
20. E.g., a one  standard deviation increase in R&D/sales results in  a  14.3 percentage point 
increase in the return to training. A one standard deviation increase in log capitalflabor results in 
an 8.2  percentage point increase in the effect of training on wage growth. 460  Stephen G. Bronars and Melissa Famulari 
ponent: most firms trained either all or none of their white-collar workers in 
our sample. We consistently  find that college graduates with low starting wages 
and high school graduates with high starting wages are the most likely to re- 
ceive employer-provided training. This suggests that employee training pro- 
grams complement formal schooling for college graduates with little work ex- 
perience but  substitute for formal schooling for  workers with  substantial 
experience and high school diplomas. 
We  find  significant returns to training, but  these returns are  somewhat 
smaller for young workers in the WCP than for similar white-collar workers in 
the NLSY. Low-starting-wage workers receive the highest returns to training, 
earning 3.5 to 10.2 percent higher current pay than untrained workers with the 
same starting pay. These results confirm the implication of human capital mod- 
els. Workers who pay a greater share of their training costs through lower start- 
ing wages experience faster wage growth. 
In our subsample of  workers in publicly traded firms, employer-provided 
training occurs significantly more frequently in large companies. Conditional 
on firm size, training programs occur relatively more often in firms that invest 
less in R&D, but the propensity for training is unrelated to capital intensity 
(conditional on firm size). We  find strong evidence that the returns to training 
are higher in companies that invest in either R&D or capital equipment. In 
conclusion, our empirical results provide mixed evidence on the complemen- 
tarity between training and investment in either R&D or capital equipment. 
Although the returns to training appear highest in companies that make invest- 
ments in  R&D or capital equipment, the incidence of  training is somewhat 
lower  in  R&D-intensive companies. Higher  returns to  employer-provided 
training in large, capital-intensive, and R&D-intensive firms may  occur for 
several reasons: (i) the typical duration of  training programs in these firms 
may exceed the mean duration in other firms, (ii) the content, intensity, and 
opportunity cost of training programs may differ across firms, and (iii) unob- 
served skill differences across trained and untrained workers may vary across 
firms and be related to firm size and capital intensity. Additional empirical 
work, using matched worker and employer data, can aid in distinguishing be- 
tween these competing hypotheses for interfirm differences in the returns to 
training. 
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